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The present study analyzes the offshoring network constructed from the information contained in the Panama 
Papers, characterizing worldwide regions and countries as well as their intra- and inter-relationships. The 
Panama Papers 2016 divulgence is the largest leak of offshoring and tax avoidance documentation. The 
document leak, with a volume content of approximately 2.6 terabytes, involves more than two hundred thousand 
enterprises in more than two hundred countries. From this information, the offshore connections of individuals 
and companies are constructed and aggregated using their countries of origin. The top offshore financial regions 
and countries of the network are identified, and their intra- and inter-relationship are mapped and described. 
We are able to identify the top countries in the offshoring network and characterize their connectivity structure, 
discovering the more prominent actors in the worldwide offshoring scenario and their range of influence.1. Introduction
The Panama Papers refer to a recent leak of 11.5 million of doc-
uments, uncovered by the International Consortium of Investigative 
Journalists (ICIJ), of confidential financial and legal documents from 
the Panamanian law firm “Mosack Fonseca” which offered corporate 
services and became one of the largest entities to provide offshore fi-
nancial services worldwide (Joaristi et al., 2019). These papers provide 
information on the financial details of individuals and public officials, 
exposing the use of offshore business for possible illicit activities. Ap-
proximately 360,000 businesses and individuals are involved in this 
filtration, covering approximately 200 countries, which are connected 
to offshore structures. Behind this fraudulent scandal, illegal operations 
of money laundering, tax evasions and fraud have been detected. The 
initial purpose of tax havens was to provide low tax provisions to attract 
investments (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009b; Bucovetsky, 2014), but the 
increase of offshoring activities has become more visible, and thus, not 
all tax havens are perceived to be safe (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009b), 
with an existing tendency to use tax havens for criminal purposes.
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Tax regulatory entities and authorities worldwide have focused their 
attention on implementing schemes to recover tax on offshore invest-
ments (Gould and Rablen, 2020). This is reinforced by the fact that 
10% of world GDP is retained in tax havens, for example, countries 
such as the United States, have estimated annual loss of tax collection 
of about $30–40 billion, due to offshore activities (Gould and Rablen, 
2020). Corporations are identified as the main tax haven users (O’Dono-
van et al., 2019), but wealthy individuals also evades taxes through the 
creation of a shell company (Joaristi et al., 2018). The Panama Papers 
showed how wealth can be hidden and taxes evaded through tax havens 
(Ait Bihi Ouali, 2020), however, there is a lack of transparency regard-
ing the offshore network, which leads to the need to study its structure 
and behavior.
Taking into account the actual necessity to illustrate the behavior 
of worldwide offshoring activities, the present research aims to ana-
lyze a network of connections between countries and regions involved 
in this practice. The network is built based on the relations that ap-
pear in the ICIJ Offshoring and Panama Papers database (Offshore Leaks 
Database, 2018) and allows for the detection of association patterns be-https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2020.e04293
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geographical regions, allowing researchers to discover the structure of 
the worldwide offshoring connections for the top countries in terms of 
occurrences in the ICIJ database. The intra- and inter-relationships be-
tween these top actors are described, and their connectivity structure is 
characterized.
Most previous research has focused on developed countries (Desai 
et al., 2004; Gumpert et al., 2016) with little research on developing 
countries (Buckley et al., 2013). The present research analyzes global 
tax haven behavior and the relationships among world-wide countries 
and regions. Therefore, the main contributions of this paper, are, first, 
to shed light on geography of money and finance and, second, to illumi-
nate international offshoring networks. Thus, new insight into the role 
they play in the global economy can be stressed.
This work importance can be highlighted on its use as an input 
for the development of tax planning and financial control mechanism. 
Suspicious countries can be detected in the offshore leaks network pre-
sented in this paper, making possible to uncover the underlying struc-
tures of these networks allowing a more transparent actions regarding 
tax evasion, corruption, and money laundering. The research of the 
structure and organization of existing offshoring might benefit, on the 
one hand, to academics and scholars and to increasing the literature on 
tax haven networks. On the other hand, can help regulatory agencies 
and policy makers to regulate tax evasion reducing capital flight.
The document is organized as follows. In Section 2: Literature Re-
view, the principal elements of the Panama Papers and illegal offshoring 
operations are detailed. In Section 3: Methodology, we describe how the 
data from the offshore-leak database was processed and organized, and 
how the offshoring network was constructed from the data. In Section 4: 
Results, we present the main outcomes of characterizing the intra- and 
inter-relationships for the top geographical regions and top countries in 
the offshoring network. Finally, Section 5: Conclusions, wraps up the 
paper and discusses the implications of our findings.
2. Literature review: worldwide offshoring activity
After the Panama Papers revelation, offshoring companies estab-
lished in tax havens, have been in the focus of the public interest, con-
stituting a crucial issue to be considered. Tax-havens regions with low 
tax rates, promoted with the objective of enhancing foreign investment, 
have increased in the last 25 years (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009a). 
At this point, Mossack Fonseca played an important role in helping 
companies and individuals establish operations in offshore jurisdictions, 
with the aim to avoid the detection by tax authorities, thereby gaining 
anonymity and secrecy regarding their operations.
The offshore financial economy is a corruption alternative that re-
inforces capital flight and tax evasion because the offshoring entities 
owners have the “benefit” of not reporting their profits and incomes to 
their respective tax authorities. Considering the veil of secrecy that of-
fers information protection, the financial operations and ownership are 
completely obscured, allowing natural persons and corporations that 
are non-residents in tax havens to accumulate financial capital (Chris-
tensen, 2011). Tax havens, among their supposed benefits, include the 
banking and commercial information protection. In this way, a blind-
ness exists regarding company owners’ identities that designates second 
persons who act as nominated directors, thereby hiding the real owners 
and offering the privilege of creating accounts that are not registered 
publicly (Jalan and Vaidyanathan, 2017).
The principal individuals related to offshoring entities are, corrupt 
officials, sportspeople, politicians, movie stars and drug dealers, all of 
them interested in hiding their assets in tax havens. Considering that 
these individuals want to hide theirs incomes from illegal transactions 
or to evade income tax, all of them use tax havens as an illegal al-
ternative (Stryker, 1998; Hebous and Lipatov, 2014). In the case of 
corporations, tax evasion is frequently used to hide illegal activities, 
such as “market rigging, insider trading, illicit political donations, em-2
bezzlement, fraud, and payment of bribes and commission kickbacks” 
(Christensen, 2011, p. 178).
One of the characteristics of tax havens is that they are small coun-
tries, with a population below 1 million people; approximately 15% 
of countries are tax havens (Dharmapala and Hines, 2009a). Accord-
ing to information collected from Fortune 500 in 2014, 358 companies 
(71.6%) had a minimum of 7,622 tax-haven subsidiaries (Akamah et 
al., 2016). This figure represents, an evasion of approximately $90 bil-
lion USD in federal taxes. There are approximately 50-60 tax havens, 
where more than the 30% of the global foreign direct investment is 
located (Haberly and Wójcik, 2014). There is a tendency for services 
companies to use offshore activities to a lesser extent than do manufac-
turing industries (Gonzalez-Navarro and Quintana-Domeque, 2016). In 
the same way, private firms have a greater tax reduction thanks to tax 
havens than public companies do (Aziz and Thornton, 2015).
The practice of offshore dissemination has multiple implications; 
for example, the tax base of non-haven countries deteriorates since the 
amount collected from taxes decreases (Bovi and Cerqueti, 2014; Jalan 
and Vaidyanathan, 2017). Likewise, tax havens promote the demoral-
ization of honest companies, when they pay their tax and compare their 
expenditures with other companies who did not, thereby losing the faith 
in the system. Another consequence of tax evasion is the additional 
controls that countries must apply to pursue and stop this practice, in-
creasing regulation costs.
At a global level, there is a repudiation for these practices that 
hide illegal acts; existing groups criticize and combat these criminal 
practices, and such groups are composed of “politicians, regulators, cit-
izen groups, and the media related to tax-haven operations”, which are 
aware that the objective of such entities is to avoid the payment of 
tax in their countries (Akamah et al., 2016, p. 2). In this sense, we build 
the Offshoring network to map the connectivity and interactions among 
countries and geographical areas worldwide to determine the top actors 
of offshoring financial operations in the ICIJ database and their range 
of influence.
3. Methodology
In this section, the process implemented to build the offshoring net-
works is detailed. The first step is to organize the data from the ICIJ 
offshore database using PostgreSQL to extract the relevant information 
to identify the connections between actors by querying the database. 
Once the information is extracted, the network is modeled, weighting 
pairs of countries’ connectivity by aggregating the different occurrences 
in the database.
3.1. Data collection and organization
The data were obtained from the ICIJ Panama Papers Offshore 
Leaks Database (https://offshoreleaks .icij .org/), where the data can be 
accessed and downloaded. The data has information of entities, inter-
mediaries, officers, addresses and edges between them. A PostgreSQL 
database was built from the aforementioned available data, to facilitate 
the extraction of information through database queries.
The “ICIJ Offshore” database consists of a set of relationships be-
tween companies and individuals with offshore companies based in tax 
havens. The structure of these relationships are listed in: (i) Entities, (ii) 
Intermediaries, (iii) Officers, (iv) Addresses, (v) Edges. The aforemen-
tioned relationships are accessible from the ICIJ database as csv files 
and are detailed in Table 1.
We use the Edges relationship (rel_type) information to build the 
connectivity between node_1 and node_2. There are 19 types of rela-
tionships, such as shareholder, beneficiary of, intermediary, president, 
secretary, director, to mention only a few. Relating these relationships 
together with the emitting and receiving nodes, the weight and direc-
tion of the network connections are built. All this information is tracked 
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Table 1
ICIJ database.
Table (csv file) Content (attributes)
Entities correspond to enterprises created in tax havens and includes general information 
and commercial registration. There are 495,309 entities with the following attributes:
name, original_name, former_name, jurisdiction, jurisdiction_description, 
company_type, address, internal_id, incorporation_date, inactivation_date, 
struck_off_date, dorm_date, status, service_provider, ibcRUC, country_codes, 
countries, note, valid_until, node_id, sourceID.
Intermediaries correspond to law firms or other intermediaries that offer offshoring ser-
vices: There are 24,183 intermediaries with the following attributes:
name, internal_id, address, valid_until, country_codes, countries, status, node_id, 
sourceID, note.
Officers correspond to individuals or companies with a role in the offshore entity. There 
are 370,873 officers with the following attributes:
name, icij_id, valid_until, country_codes, countries, node_id, sourceID, note.
Addresses corresponds to postal addresses of companies and individuals in the database. 
There are 151,665 addresses and the attributes are:
address, icij_id, valid_until, country_codes, countries, node_id, sourceID, note.
The Edges data contains the existing relations between all the above tables and is the 
product of text mining the Panama Papers. The attributes available are:
node_1, rel_type, node_2, sourceID, valid_until, start_date, end_date. Here node_1 
refers to the issuing entity and node_2 refers to the receiver entity.to the country of origin of individuals and companies, which are in-
dexed by the field sourceID present in all csv files.
3.2. Network construction
To build the network, a set of database queries are performed to 
relate pairs of countries. The weight connection between pairs of coun-
tries is proportional to the number of occurrences from the queries 
obtained for all possible relations according to Entities, Intermedi-
aries, Officers, Addresses and Edges. The resulting connectivity from 
a query is a directed link, using the information node_1 and node_2 
from Edges. Inner join subqueries are performed to acquire all possible 
relations between each pair of countries. Finally, a high level query is 
performed to aggregate all the results of similar tuples returned in the 
subqueries. In this way, one obtains a raw value for the total number of 
occurrences 𝑎𝑟
𝑖𝑗
of pairs of countries 𝑖, 𝑗 for each type of relationship 𝑟. 
These values are normalized between 0 and 4 for each of type of the 19 
types of relationships 𝑟 ∈ {0, 1, … , 19} and for each country 𝑖. The nor-
malization 𝑇𝑟 and the weight of the relationship 𝑅𝑖𝑗 between countries 









𝑟 ∈ {0,1,… ,19}.
Then, the network connectivity matrix 𝐶𝑖𝑗 is built as follows:
𝐶𝑖𝑗 =
{
1, if 𝑅𝑖𝑗 > 𝜃,
0, otherwise.
(2)
Here, 𝜃 is a trimming threshold value and it is related to the value of 
the desired cut-off above, of which the weight of the relationship will 
be considered as a connection between two countries. One can also use 
a quantile to obtain a value of 𝜃 to build the chord diagrams obtained 
in the next section, Section 4. In the latter case, the relations 𝑅𝑖𝑗 > 𝜃𝑞 , 
where 𝜃𝑞 relates to the 𝑞-th quantile, will be used as the trimming level 
for the connection weights.
Then, the offshoring network is described by the adjacency matrix 
𝑂𝑖𝑗 = 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑅𝑖𝑗 . This adjacency matrix 𝑶 is used to characterize the off-
shoring network structure between countries using chord diagrams. As 
mentioned, this adjacency matrix corresponds to a directed network, 
thus forming a non-symmetric matrix. Self-connectivity is allowed, 
since node_1 and node_2 from Edges could correspond to an individ-
ual or company within the same country.
3.3. Network characterization
The network structure obtained in the previous subsection is char-
acterized for countries and mesoscopic geographical relations. The top 3
countries in the database are identified according to their number of 
occurrences, and a cut-off is identified for the top 22 countries, whose 
occurrence frequencies are modeled by a power function.
Once the top countries are identified, a chord diagram is used to 
depict the intra- and inter-relationships between the blocks of the meso-
scopic network, in the case of geographical regions, and between the 
top countries (see Section 4). The blocks (regions or countries) are ar-
ranged radially around a circle, and the relationships are drawn as arcs 
that connect the blocks. A connection is represented as internal when it 
connects a country itself or, in the case of geographical regions, when it 
connects countries belonging to the same regions. Chord diagrams are a 
highly intuitive way to depict the structure of networks and have been 
used to describe migration flows (Abel and Sander, 2014), enterprise 
sustainability reporting (González et al., 2015, 2017), and offshoring 
maps (Dominguez et al., 2018) to mention only a few.
To construct the chord diagrams that are presented in Fig. 6 and 
Fig. 3, the strength of these internal and external connections is mea-
sured. To determine the size of the connection, the chord diagram con-
siders the number of links between enterprises among the regions/coun-
tries and the size (weighted degree) of the region/country where the 
connections originated. The gaps between the connections and the 
blocks indicate the link direction, as detailed in the next section.
4. Results: offshoring network structure and behavior
This section introduces the overall behavior of occurrences for coun-
tries in the offshore leak database using a histogram and modeling the 
occurrence frequencies. The offshoring network obtained, as explained 
in the previous Section 3, is presented, and the network structure is dis-
cussed in terms of countries and their geographical representation. The 
connectivity structure of the top countries in the database is described. 
Also, the results are summarized for the world geographical regions, 
analyzing their inter- and intra-relationships.
4.1. Countries’ occurrences behavior in the Offshore Leaks database
Fig. 1 depicts the behavior of the counties’ occurrences in the Off-
shore Leaks database. The figure plots the number of Offshores per 
countries, ranked from the largest occurrence to the smallest. The 𝑋-
axis represents the list of countries in decreasing order according to 
their occurrences in the database, which is represented in the 𝑌 -axis. 
The corresponding graphic can be seen as an histogram for the Offshore 
frequencies. Both axes are in logarithmic scale. Approximately the first 
twenty countries (larger occurrences) are fitted to a power function, 
while the second half is fitted to an exponential function (less frequent). 
These top countries’ occurrences decay regularly and likely have a sim-
ilar behavior independent of the scale of the number of occurrences. 
These are the larger tax havens identified, and their interrelationships 
D. Dominguez et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04293Fig. 1. Countries histogram ordered by number of occurrences in the Offshore 
Leaks database, represented with black circle markers. Power law distribution 
for top countries 𝑃 (𝑥) ∝ 𝑎 ∗ 𝑥(−𝑐) in blue dashed line. Exponential distribution 
for the rest of countries 𝑃 (𝑥) ∝ 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑐 ∗ 𝑥) in red solid line.
are described in the rest of the analysis. The rest of the countries de-
cay in such a way that the frequency variation rate is faster. These are 
the countries with a marginal number of connections in the network 
and that will eventually be disconnected by the effect of the threshold 
parameter used to build the networks.
Let us take a closer look at each region of the histogram. The first 
countries are adjusted by a power-law distribution, 𝑃 (𝑥) ∝ 𝑎 ∗ 𝑥(−𝑐), 
which looks lineal in a log-log scale. It fits the left part of the histogram 
well, for large frequencies, with a power of 𝑐 = 0.7, which falls between 
𝑦 = 2∕3 and 𝑦 = 3∕4. Considering it is a probability distribution for the 
Offshores, 𝑐 < 1 implies a heavy tail, which yields to a divergence if it 
was not bounded for a given finite critical rank 𝑋𝑐 .
The power-law is also known as a Pareto distribution (Schumpeter, 
1949), in the economics field, or a scale-free distribution (Barabási and 
Albert, 1999), in numerous of other fields, such as language, history, 
geography, biology or physics. For instance, it can model a variety of 
physical or social phenomena, such as the sizes of avalanches of snow or 
rocks in a mountain, sand piles, earthquake magnitudes, firm sizes, city 
sizes, income and wealth, stock market activities, international trade, or 
neural spike delay, all of which starts from a simple hypothesis about 
the neighborhood of the interaction process (Marković and Gros, 2014).
It was also found that the presence of hubs will give the degree 
distribution a long tail, indicating the presence of nodes with a much 
higher degree than most other nodes. Among the explanations, the the-
ory for random graphs predicts that the number of connections of an 
evolutionary network will be described by power-law, with 𝑐 = 𝑎∕𝑏, 
where 𝑎 is the born tax for new connections, and 𝑏 is growth tax of 
the previous connections (Gabaix, 2009). According to this, and taking 
into account the fit of the Offshore power-law distribution, one may 
conjecture that the born tax of new Off-shores are 𝑎 = 2 − 3, while the 
growth tax of old Offshores is 𝑏 = 3 − 4.
It is worth mentioning that all of these scale-free phenomena are 
based in a competition between external drivers and inner dynamics. 
The inner forces are dissipative, being guided by an optimization prin-
ciple. One may speculate that the role of the dissipation in the Offshores 
is played by optimizing their owner profits, which is equivalent to min-
imizing their loss, both from legal taxes of their original countries, or 
from the cost of hiding capital in the tax-haven jurisdiction.
Finally, the remaining countries in the region of low frequencies fit 
an exponential distribution 𝑃 (𝑥) ∝ 𝑎 ∗ 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑐 ∗ 𝑥), describing the events 
in a Poisson process, in which events occur continuously and indepen-4
Fig. 2. Geographic representation of offshoring countries and their relation-
ships. From top to bottom, edge are trimmed for weights below thresholds: 
𝜃 = {0.5, 1.5, 2.5}.
dently at a constant average rate. Such a distribution does not require 
an upper cutoff because it is always convergent. The meaning of the 
value 𝑐 = 0.04 found in our fit is related to the time scale of the pro-
cess, and since we have not considered either the time of each Offshore 
in our database, or compared our results to other databases from a dif-
ferent time, nothing can be concluded with respect to 𝑐. However, it 
might be worth considering new releases of the Offshore documents, to 
consider the evolution of 𝑐.
4.2. Offshore map relations for countries
In Fig. 2, a geographic representation of the principal countries in 
the offshoring network is depicted. The countries are connected in a 
directed way, that is, the outgoing and incoming connection may dif-
fer. Note that both directions can occur if they exceed the indicated 
threshold. The countries can also have self connections, accounting for 
mainly internal operations. From top to bottom (in Fig. 2) the thresh-
olds values of 𝜃 = {0.5, 1.5, 2.5} are used. For 𝜃 = 0.5, a small level of 
trimming is performed, thus the top panel depicts a very connected 
world-wide offshoring network. For 𝜃 = 1.5 in the middle panel, Europe 
countries connections start to dilute. The behavior for Europe which be-
comes disconnected when increasing the trimming threshold, indicates 
that enterprises from that regions are more lawful players in terms of 
taxing and financial fair play (Gould and Rablen, 2020). Finally, the 
extensive trimming (high value of 𝜃 = 2.5) of the offshoring network al-
lows to discover the top countries in the offshoring network which is in 
correspondence with the histogram in Fig. 1.
The relationships between the top countries are discussed in detail 
using the chord diagram depicted Fig. 3. The top countries involved 
are the Bahamas, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, China, 
the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Guernsey, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Jer-
sey, Malaysia, Panama, Russia, Samoa, Singapore, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
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Top Countries’ acronyms per ISO-3166 standard.
Country Acronym
Bahamas BHS





















Fig. 3. Offshoring map (chord-diagram) for top countries. Top 0.1 percent of 
connections between countries. Quantile 𝑞 = 0.999, trimming for weights below 
threshold of 𝜃𝑞 = 2.92. See acronyms of countries in Table 2.
Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela (see Ta-
ble 2).
Fig. 3 shows the offshoring relationships for the top 0.1 percent of 
connections in the network. The countries (nodes) that remained con-
nected after the trimming are the ones shown in the chord diagram. 
The British Virgin Islands (VGB) occupies the greater proportion in 
the representation of the offshoring map, and it is recognized by Mos-
sack Fonseca’s in the Offshore Leaks Database files as the favorite tax 
haven, where approximately 113 thousand entities are registered, 1819 
of which are linked with Taiwan. Likewise, the VGB have an important 
volume of operations with countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, India, 
Indonesia, Hong Kong and China.
Hong Kong (HKG) is considered as another trendy tax haven in the 
Panama Papers when companies are looking for tax avoidance/eva-5
sion (Bryane and Goo, 2016). Approximately 90% of Hong Kong’s gross 
domestic product (GDP) comes from the service industries, with the fi-
nancial services included as one of the five most important industry 
services. The principal relations detected are with the British Virgin Is-
lands, with Samoa to a lesser extent and with companies and persons 
from the same country. It has been found that such origins of evaded 
tax are related to money laundering and financing of terrorist activi-
ties, with approximately 500 entities connected with Hong Kong (Wang, 
2017).
Singapore (SGP), despite having a business-friendly tax regime, 
maintains a higher connection with the British Virgin Islands, as was 
previously mentioned, and with the Cook Islands (COK), both of which 
are no-tax territories. There are 4027 registered entities in VGB related 
to Singapore and 48 registered in COK. Similarly, Singapore has re-
ported 706 offshore own entities related to itself by operations that are 
supported by flexible tax politics.
Samoa has been an offshore finance center since 1987 and is the 
sixth most popular tax havens in the Panama Papers; it is focused 
on provisions for international business companies, since their princi-
pal market comprises countries from South East Asia (Rawlings et al., 
2005). In the Offshore Leaks Database, it is possible to confirm the ex-
istence of 265 offshore entities in Samoa’s jurisdiction linked to Taiwan 
(Offshore Leaks Database, 2018).
China (CHN) has links with Hong Kong, being their first investor, 
followed by the British Virgin Islands (Weichenrieder and Xu, 2015). 
China, like India, has propitiated zones with special economic regula-
tions with attractive tax systems to attract offshoring investors. Tai-
wan’s (TWN) offshore entities establish relations predominantly with 
Samoa (WSM) and the British Virgin Islands (VGB).
The Cook Islands (COK) are a group of Pacific islands that “concen-
trates on forming trusts to protect assets from seizure by courts, wives, 
husbands or creditors” (Vlcek, 2013, p. 652). Their principal relations 
are with companies from the same country, though they are also linked 
as an operations receiver from Singapore and the United States (USA); 
the connection with USA is the larger of the two. It is worth noting that 
the USA maintains its largest volume of offshore operations with the 
Cook Islands and, to a lesser extent, with the British Virgin Islands.
Panama (PAN) is known as a popular tax haven, having predomi-
nantly internal relationships and, to a minor scale, a relationship with 
the Bahamas (BHS), with 1120 offshore entities with jurisdiction in BHS 
linked with PAN. Malaysia (MYS), although having a lower weight com-
pared to the other countries analyzed, has principal operations with 
the British Virgin Islands and Indonesia (IDN). Jersey (JEY) is another 
hosts of offshore finance centers; the operations from this activity repre-
sent 90% of its government revenues (Hampton and Christensen, 2002). 
Their principal operations are related to other entities or persons from 
the same country.
India (IND) establishes their principal offshore relations with the 
British Virgin Islands, and it has been noted in studies that Indian 
entities related to tax havens, pay 30% less tax than another firms with-
out these connections (Bryane and Goo, 2016). Indonesia (IDN) is also 
linked with the British Virgin Islands, with small relationships with an-
other countries, such as Singapore and Samoa. Likewise, Indonesia is 
related, as an operation receiver, to Singapore and Thailand (THA).
Guernsey (GGY), a Crown dependency of the United Kingdom, is an-
other international financial center which has larger operations with it-
self. There are other countries in Fig. 3, that contain minority operations 
compared to the rest of those analyzed. One of them is Venezuela (VEN), 
linked with the British Virgin Islands as well as Thailand, which is 
also connected with Indonesia. Russia (RUS), Cyprus (CYP), Switzerland 
(CHE) and the United Kingdom (GBR) have mainly small connections 
with themselves. The Cayman Islands (CYM) are linked as a receiver to 
Taiwan and to themselves, and the Bahamas (BHS) are connected with 
Panama and the British Virgin Islands. Again, the self-connections can 
be interpreted as the internal network to cover the offshoring opera-
tions of their external investors.
D. Dominguez et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04293Fig. 4. Network structure and clusters for top countries in the database. See 
acronyms of countries in Table 2.
It is interesting to highlight that of the 22 countries that appear in 
the chord diagram, there are three that cover the greatest proportion 
of offshore relationships: the British Virgin Islands (VGB), Hong Kong, 
second, and Singapore. The high participation of the British Virgin Is-
lands within the world of tax havens, being an area highly welcomed by 
countries of different regions as a financial center. This is in correspon-
dence with the research developed by Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017), 
where it is stated that the majority of shell entities are located in VGB. 
Thus, VGB constitutes a highly used tax haven due to the existing gaps 
in its tax and regulatory laws and the facilities it offers in the creation 
of offshore entities, which is reflected as VGB being the nation with the 
lowest score regarding regulatory gaps and secrecy by Corporate Tax 
Haven Index (Robertson, 2019). It is also noted that most of the coun-
tries studied have relations not only with other regions, but also with 
companies and entities from the same country.
4.3. Network structure for top countries
Fig. 4 depicts the connectivity structure of the countries with a 
high number of occurrences in the database, corresponding to the top 
0.1 percent of connections between countries, (quantile (𝑞 = 0.999), 
𝜃𝑞 = 2.92). According to 𝜃𝑞 = 2.92, the connected countries remaining 
are the 22 depicted, whether a country is present in the graph as an iso-
lated node is due to a self-connection that exceeds the threshold. Then, 
the clusters that maximizes the modularity, which is a quality index 
for graph clustering, are found. The optimization is performed by max-
imizing the modularity measure over all possible partitions, via Integer 
Linear Programming (Brandes et al., 2008).
One can appreciate that the most interconnected tax haven is the 
British Virgin Islands (VGB), followed by Hong Kong (HKG), Indonesia 
(IDN), Singapore (SGP) and China (CHN). It can be observed that tax 
havens are moving to Asia, since the central (larger) cluster is com-
posed mainly of Asian nodes (countries), with the British Virgin Islands 
(VGB) as a central hub of this cluster as well as for the whole network 
as shown in Fig. 4. China (CHN) and Hong Kong (HKG) are together in a 
cluster, where China is emitting transactions while Hong Kong is acting 
as a transmitter of offshoring operations to the largest cluster, as well 
to a cluster composed of Samoa (WSM), which is a predominant receiver 
of offshoring operations; Taiwan (TWN), an operations emitter; and the 
Cayman Islands (CYM), a receiver. Another cluster is created by the 
United States (USA), an emitter, and the Cook Islands (COK), a receiver. 
The Bahamas (BHS) act as an emitter connected to the main cluster and 
hub (VGB) and to the receiver node Panama (PAN). Finally, the discon-
nected nodes are the United Kingdom (GBR), Switzerland (CHE), Cyprus 

















South East Asia SEA
Kemme et al. (2017), this can be an indicator that although investors 
in general value close proximity, and similarities in legal systems and 
country governance, they prefer transactions and information privacy 
to avoid detection and persecution. Thus, when inter-country tax and 
investments information exchange agreements have been signed, peo-
ple and companies could move their money to another destinations.
4.4. Offshore map relations to geographic regions
Fig. 5 depicts the geographic representation of the involved geo-
graphical regions and their relationships, according the Offshore Leaks 
database. The relationships between regions are represented for differ-
ent values of the threshold 𝜃 = {1, 2.5, 4, 5} in purple, green, red, and 
blue arcs, respectively. The arc direction is given by the connections 
above the threshold. A node (region) with an outgoing arc accounts 
for a flow of outgoing operations that is larger than the threshold and 
a flow of incoming operations that is smaller than the threshold. A 
node (region) with an incoming arc accounts for the contrary. Strong 
self-connections (𝜃 >= 3) are represented as a yellow-filled circle and 
weak self-connections as bronze-filled circles (𝜃 < 3). These results are 
presented and discussed using the chord-diagram for a better visual rep-
resentation of the relationships between regions in Fig. 6.
The principal involved regions in the offshoring network are listed 
with their acronyms in Table 3. These regions are the American An-
tilles, Central America, Eastern Asia, Germanic Europe, Latin Europe, 
Maghreb Africa, the Middle East, North America, Oceania, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Slavic Europe, South America, South Asia and South East Asia.
Fig. 6 shows the offshoring network relationship structure for the 
connections’ 80th percentile for the world geographical regions ob-
tained from the mesoscopic configuration of the network defined in the 
previous section (Section 3). The size of the segments in the chord di-
agram is proportional to the number of countries in the geographical 
block and their weighted importance in terms of 𝑅 (see Eq. (2)). The 
width of the links between segments indicates countries’ connections 
that move from one region to another. Clearly, the links are thicker 
when they connect the largest blocks and according to the weighted 
relationship 𝑅 between countries belonging the group. One should ob-
serve that the chord diagrams represent the outgoing influences as 
connections that have a larger gap from the departing region/country, 
and the incoming influences are represented by a smaller gap from the 
arriving region/country.
For example, the relationship between EAS (Eastern Asia) and AMA
(American Antilles) indicates a strong relationship between entities be-
longing to the Eastern Asian (EAS) countries offshoring to the Antilles. 
Similarly, the relationship between South-East Asia (SEA) and the An-
tilles (AMA) indicates that the Antilles is receiving numerous offshoring 
operations from these regions (EAS, SEA). Likewise, East Asia has 
large offshore relationships with companies based in Oceania (OCE) 
and with other entities settled in the East Asia region. Analyzing South 
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Fig. 5. Geographic representation of Offshoring for worldwide regions. Regions’ connectivity for different values of 𝜃 = {1.0, 2.5, 4.0, 5.0} in purple, green, red, and 
blue links, respectively.Fig. 6. Offshoring map (chord-diagram) for world regions. 80th percentile of 
regions, quantile 𝑞 = 0.8, trimming for weights below threshold of 𝜃𝑞 = 1.89. See 
acronyms of world regions in Table 3.
East Asia, their offshoring entities, in addition to being related to the 
Antilles, as mentioned previously, are also related to Oceania and com-
panies from the region. In the case of Slavic Europe, a small number of 
the relationships are developed with entities from South East Asia and 
the Antilles, the prevailing offshoring relationships are inside this re-
gion. Germanic Europe, to a smaller scale, establishes offshore relations 
with South East Asia, the Antilles and Latin Europe. In Slavic Europe 
(SEU), Germanic Europe (GEU) and Latin Europe (LEU), their offshore 
entities predominantly establish relations with firms from the same re-
gion. On the other hand, the Antilles does not exert a large influence 
on other regions but has a extensive self-connection, which indicates a 
strong presence of relationships among the countries/entities inside the 
region.7
Oceania is a region that mainly receives offshoring operations, ap-
proximately 70% in comparison to the emitted operations (30%). From 
this 70%, a smaller part corresponds to internal operations and the 
larger corresponds to external (countries) companies. This proportion 
means that most of the offshoring entities are from regions such as 
North America, South East Asia and Eastern Asia, with links to Oceania 
by relations based in address, intermediaries and officers, among oth-
ers. On the other hand, the Middle East (MEA) received operations from 
their own entities, but their entities also establish relations with South 
East Asia and the Antilles.
Central America (CAM) establishes operations with their own enti-
ties and with the Antilles, in both directions, as a receiver and as a 
emitter. In North America (NAM), more than a half of the offshoring op-
erations are between their entities and regions, such as Oceania, the 
Antilles and South Easts Asia, which means that North America is a 
region where large offshored entities are generated and where connec-
tions such as intermediaries, officers and address are established with 
firms or persons from the aforementioned receiving regions.
There are three remaining regions to be included in the analysis: 
South America (SAM), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and South Asia (SAS), 
which are worth studying even though they have few relationships com-
pared to the other analyzed regions. South America is linked basically 
with their own entities and with the Antilles; Sub-Saharan Africa is only 
linked with South East Asia; and South Asia is connected with the An-
tilles and South East Asia.
Up to this point, it is valid to highlight that from the thirteen regions 
involved, only four account for the major offshored operations: Antilles 
(the largest one), Eastern Asia, South East Asia and Oceania. Of all the 
studied regions, the predominant behavior is that these regions contain 
offshored entities that establish relationships with other companies or 
people from the same region and from other regions. Only Antilles and 
Oceania predominantly receive operations, based on connections with 
intermediaries, officers, and addresses, among others. The internal re-
lationships can be seen as the internal network of entities to cover the 
traces of the receiving offshoring operations from other regions.
5. Conclusions
Using network modeling and analysis techniques, it was possible 
to characterize the connectivity structure for the top 22 countries in 
the ICIJ database and to identify the central actors and their influence 
in the offshoring network. The network was built from the different 
D. Dominguez et al. Heliyon 6 (2020) e04293relations occurring between emitting and receiving entities in the ICIJ 
database and aggregated for their corresponding countries. The network 
of entities has been represented mesoscopically at the level of countries 
and geographical regions, and their intra- and inter-relationships have 
been mapped.
The findings provide a number of relevant conclusions. As com-
mented before, we have identified the main offshoring regions/coun-
tries and how they are related to the rest of the worldwide actors. The 
most prominent regions identified as offshoring receptors are the Amer-
ican Antilles (AMA), South East Asia (SEA), Eastern Asia (EAS), and 
Oceania (OCE).
The most prevalent offshore receiving jurisdictions were identified 
as the British Virgin Islands (VGB), Hong Kong (HKG), Singapore (SGP), 
Indonesia (IDN), the Cook Islands (COK) and Samoa (WSM). The British 
Virgin Islands are the most predominant actor, serving as a hub in the 
offshoring network connecting countries from different regions.
The dimension of internal relationships is important, since it can 
give a measurement of the internal network used by the countries to 
hinder the tracking of money in tax havens. The first conclusion is that 
the offshoring size of regions and the number of offshoring countries 
has grown and diversified. A second conclusion is that these regions 
and countries have a different role and importance, as described in 
this work. Thus, the “traditional” tax havens in the Antilles and Central 
America continue to play a relevant role, however, Switzerland seems 
to have lost relevance. Although there is no evidence of the impact of 
tax information exchange agreements yet (Kemme et al., 2017), they 
could be one of factors that is changing the status quo. This assertion 
should be taken cautiously because more research is required. On the 
other hand, Asia has strongly emerged as a tax haven, and its evolution 
should be watched.
Building a network of offshoring entities and describing it on a 
mesoscopic scale, in this case by countries and geographical regions, 
offered interesting insights into the worldwide offshoring system. Ap-
plying this approach in order to tackle a variety of socio-economic 
problems (González et al., 2018a,b) is of interest to obtain a plausible 
description of the structure and intra/inter-relationships of the system 
components. Using the knowledge of existing connections, regulatory 
entities, both nationally and internationally, can act in these networks 
with the aim of increasing their control and eliminating fraudulent be-
havior. The origin of tax havens was based on the search for capital 
investments, this initial origin has tended to deviate from its purpose to 
hide transfer and concealment of illicit capital. In this sense, the present 
investigation is a valid study that allows to discover structures of the 
offshore relations between regions and countries around the world, to 
better regulate such activities.
The selected level of detail for this work (country level), might be 
a limitation in terms of the patterns that were discovered. As a fur-
ther project, we can apply network analysis techniques as well as a 
complex network characterization to the whole offshoring network at 
microscopic level (i.e. enterprise information) to determine relation-
ships that can be linked not only to the geographical analysis conducted 
in this work but also to other types of structures and behavior that may 
emerge in the offshoring network.
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